Interfaces · Coalition
Coalition entities
Exchange, Fund, Signal Markets, Earth Pulse Network, Captain Landseed. None owns a DAO; none holds a benefit unit.
Each coalition entity has a defined interface to per-property governance vehicles. None is a parent. None holds benefit units. None has governance rights. They are counterparties at well-defined interfaces.
The Registry (methodology + credit issuance)
| Aspect | Specification |
|---|---|
| What it is | A Landseed function (eventually possibly its own entity) that issues Earth Credits against attested condition. The crux of the assay-office thesis. |
| Inputs from | Layer 3 measurement (attestation receipts of EC-M-1.1 outputs) |
| Outputs to | Earth Credit buyers (direct, via Exchange, via Fund); revenue to property DAO/LLC treasuries |
| DAO interface | Routes net proceeds (less protocol fees, exchange fees, methodology buffer) to the relevant DAO/LLC based on which property’s credits sold |
| What it cannot do | Hold DAO positions; vote in DAOs; negotiate distribution rules with DAO members |
| Governance of itself | Currently a Landseed PBC function with multi-key control, audit committee, published issuance rules. Long-term: may need its own governance entity (cooperative or foundation) with methodology stewards as members |
The registry is the most architecturally important coalition function. Its integrity is the integrity of Earth Credits as a commodity.
The Exchange (when built)
| Aspect | Specification |
|---|---|
| What it is | A venue where Earth Credits are listed, ordered, and traded |
| Inputs from | Earth Credit listings from the registry |
| Outputs to | Sale proceeds back to the registry, which routes to property DAOs/LLCs |
| DAO interface | None directly. Exchange does not call DAO contracts, has no DAO credentials, does not see DAO state. |
| What it cannot do | Hold DAO positions; pool DAO treasuries; offer “fund of properties.” Crossing this line means it has stopped being the Exchange and started being a fund-of-DAOs (Bright Line 4 in 04-perimeter/). |
Exchange status: planned, not built. Most properties’ first credit sales will be bilateral (direct from registry to buyer); Exchange is for scaling and price discovery once volume justifies.
Signal Markets (earthmarkets.ai)
| Aspect | Specification |
|---|---|
| What it is | Prediction markets on ecological outcomes; autonomous EMM market-making; participants forecast measurable Earth-system outcomes and are scored |
| Inputs from | Layer 3 attestations (information only) |
| Outputs to | Public information about ecological signals |
| DAO interface | None currently. Possible future: a DAO might consume specific Signal Market indices as inputs to management decisions (“if regional pollinator decline market shifts to >70%, convene management plan ratification vote”). One-way data flow only. |
| What it cannot do | Trade positions linked to a specific property’s outcomes. “Will Property X’s ECI increase next year?” markets blur the line between information and speculation on a member’s stake. We do not build property-specific markets. |
Signal Markets status: partially live; further evolution unclear.
The Institutional Fund (planned)
| Aspect | Specification |
|---|---|
| What it is | A vehicle that aggregates institutional capital into Earth Credit purchases. Investors buy fund shares; fund buys Earth Credits; investors get exposure to Earth Credit performance. |
| Inputs from | Investor capital (separate securities-law analysis applies to the fund itself) |
| Outputs to | Earth Credit purchase orders to Exchange or directly to registry |
| DAO interface | None. Same interface as any large credit buyer. Does not hold DAO benefit units. Does not vote in any DAO. |
| What it cannot do | Take DAO governance positions in exchange for capital commitments. If a property’s landowner needs upfront cash and offers DAO participation in exchange, that is a beneficiary admission decision made by the DAO under its template’s rules — and the new beneficiary must have a real-world property relationship. The Fund itself, a generic capital pool, does not qualify. |
| Operational note | When the Fund purchases at scale, it dominates a property’s revenue. DAO economics modules can include diversification rules (“no single buyer >X% of annual sales”) as a deploy parameter. |
Fund status: planned, Phase 3 of Landseed roadmap. Not in scope for first 1–2 years of architecture execution.
Market Makers
| Aspect | Specification |
|---|---|
| What they are | Third-party liquidity providers on the Exchange, providing two-sided markets in Earth Credits |
| Inputs from | Exchange order flow |
| Outputs to | Improved Exchange liquidity |
| DAO interface | None. Exchange participants only, not DAO participants. |
| What they cannot do | Make markets in benefit units (not allowed under Bright Line 1 — non-transferable units). Arbitrage governance positions or treasury balances. |
Market Maker status: not yet relevant; depends on Exchange existence and volume.
Captain Landseed (Embodied Company Agent)
| Aspect | Specification |
|---|---|
| What it is | Autonomous content agent publishing citation-first science to social platforms. Currently deployed on Fly.io. |
| Inputs from | Public methodology content; attestation results (where they’re public) |
| Outputs to | Social media platforms; partner outreach |
| DAO interface | None. Agent’s content may reference DAO outcomes (“DAO-managed property X reported 12% ECI improvement”); agent has no DAO access, no governance rights, no treasury interaction. Publisher, not participant. |
| Publication risk | False or misleading claims about a property’s ecological condition could create liability — particularly if claims influence Earth Credit prices. Mitigations: (a) the agent’s claims about specific properties must reference cryptographically attested ECI values, never agent-generated estimates; (b) marketing claims about Earth Credits as financial instruments are prohibited at the agent’s content-policy layer; (c) all claims must include their attestation source so corrections are unambiguous. The agent operates under the same content discipline as the methodology stewards. |
Captain Landseed status: live and operating.
Earth Pulse Network (sensor infrastructure, planned)
| Aspect | Specification |
|---|---|
| What it is | Distributed sensor network providing continuous in-situ ecological data, feeding back into EC-M-1.1 |
| Inputs from | Physical sensors deployed at properties |
| Outputs to | Methodology layer (sensor data is one input among many to EC-M-1.1) |
| DAO interface | Produces data. Sensor data flows up through Layer 3; the DAO consumes attested results, not raw sensor data. |
| Operational note | Sensors are physical equipment owned by Landseed (or designated infrastructure entity), not by the DAO. Installation, ownership, maintenance, and removal are governed by the NRD-lite’s measurement standing clause and the DAO’s management plan ratification module. |
Earth Pulse Network status: hardware design complete; field deployment not yet operational.
Landseed PBC’s posture across the coalition
Landseed PBC sits behind the entire coalition as methodology steward and operator of the registry, methodology, and agent infrastructure. Landseed has one seat in every property DAO/LLC with limited voting scope and a guardian veto, articulated in the templates.
Landseed’s revenue model in this architecture (per 00-foundations/04-business-model.md):
| Source | Description |
|---|---|
| Protocol fees | Small ongoing share (typical 2–5%) of distributions in each property DAO/LLC |
| Registry service fees | Per-issuance or per-volume fees on Earth Credit creation |
| Methodology licensing | Long-term, if EC-M is licensed to other registrars |
| Premium services | To coalition entities (Fund pays for premium attestation packages, etc.) |
This is infrastructure economics. Landseed does not capture acquisition value, trading rents, treasury yield, or governance control.
Why coalition entities are not part of the architecture’s deployment
Each coalition entity, when built, is a separate development effort — not part of NRD-DAO architecture deployment. The architecture’s deployment is property by property; coalition entities are infrastructure that supports many properties.
For first deployments:
- Registry: must be operational (already is, in basic form)
- Captain Landseed: optional (already operational)
- Earth Pulse Network: optional (not yet operational; satellite-only assessment works without)
- Exchange: not assumed (bilateral sales work)
- Fund: not assumed (bilateral buyers work)
- Market Makers: not relevant (no Exchange)
- Signal Markets: not assumed (information only)
What changes if a coalition entity fails
Each coalition entity’s failure has different consequences:
| Failure | Consequence |
|---|---|
| Registry function fails (Landseed-internal failure) | Credit issuance pauses; existing credits remain valid; methodology continues; Landseed PBC business continuity becomes urgent (06-risks/) |
| Exchange fails (vendor failure) | Bilateral sales continue; no architecture-level impact |
| Fund fails (investor losses) | Fund’s investors are affected; properties continue (different buyers) |
| Captain Landseed fails | Public communications stop; architecture continues |
| Earth Pulse Network fails | Sensor data unavailable; methodology falls back to satellite-only; ECI scores degraded but still produced |
| Signal Markets fails | Information signal lost; not architectural |
The architecture is robust to most coalition entity failures. The single most critical coalition function is the registry; its continuity is the focus of methodology IP licensing into a foundation per 06-risks/.
How coalition entities relate to each other
Some coalition entities depend on each other:
| Dependency | Description |
|---|---|
| Exchange depends on Registry | Exchange lists what Registry issues |
| Fund depends on Exchange and Registry | Fund buys what’s listed/issued |
| Market Makers depend on Exchange | They make markets on the Exchange |
| Captain Landseed depends on attestations | Agent references what’s attested |
| Earth Pulse Network depends on methodology | Sensor data is consumed by methodology |
These cross-entity dependencies are operational, not governance. None of them implicates the per-property architecture. The architecture’s per-property DAOs/LLCs depend on Registry (for credit issuance and revenue routing) and on attestations (for measurement consumption). Other coalition entities are downstream and optional.